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Philosophical considerations always already entangled in mathematics
education research
David W. Stinson

Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA

Abstract: In this paper, I explore how mathematics education research is always already
entangled with and in ontological, epistemological, and ethical considerations—that is,
philosophical considerations—of the researcher (or research team) from beginning to end. The
danger in too much of the existing mathematics education research, however, is limited
acknowledgement of how philosophical considerations drive both knowledge production and
knowledge dissemination in the field. Illustrating how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and
ethics are made sense of across the research paradigm spectrum—predict, understand,
emancipate, and deconstruct—sheds light on not only the possible divergences in approaches to
research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the concepts.

INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past 30 years or so, several mathematics education researchers and scholars have
explored just what the inclusion of a philosophical dimension might provide the discipline
mathematics education (cf. Higginson, 1980). In the early 1980s, this inclusion was demonstrated
through the formation of the Topic Study Group on Theory in Mathematics Education in 1984 at
the 5th International Congress for Mathematical Education. Within the discussions of that group,
philosophical considerations often took center stage. The purpose of the group, as Steiner (1985)
summarized, was “to give mathematics education a higher degree of self-reflectedness and self-
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assertiveness, to promote another way of thinking and of looking at the problems and their
interrelations” (p. 16, emphasis in original). International collaborations found in edited volumes
from the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s have continue to illustrate the importance of including
philosophical dimensions. For instance, edited volumes such as the International Commission on
Mathematical Instruction study Mathematics Education as a Research Domain: A Search for
Identity (Sierpinska & Kilpatrick, 1998) and the three editions of the International Handbook of
Mathematics Education (Bishop et al., 1996, 2003; Clements et al., 2013) contain several chapters
exploring philosophical dimensions. Paul Ernest, through his many books and edited volumes
(e.g., Ernest, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1998) and his founding and ongoing editorship of the
Philosophy of Mathematics Education Journal, approaching its 30-year anniversary, is the most
noted scholar who continues to bring philosophical dimensions to the fore in mathematics
education.
Ernest (1991), in his foundational and often-cited book The Philosophy of Mathematics Education,
surveys the philosophical dimensions of both mathematics and mathematics education. Drawing
on Higginson’s (1980) argument that all human intellectual activity rests on assumptions of a
philosophical type, Ernest questions some of the ontological, epistemological, and ethical
problems and issues (among others) surrounding the philosophy of mathematics, the nature of
learning, the aims of education, the nature of teaching, and the philosophy of mathematics
education. Recently, Ernest (2016b) contended that applying philosophical methods to

mathematics education matters because it gives people new ‘glasses’ through which to see the world. It
enables people to see beyond official stories about the society, mathematics, and education. It provides
thinking tools for questioning the status quo, for seeing ‘what’ is not what ‘has to be’; enabling us to
imagine alternatives [sic] possibilities. (p. 2)

Here, I aim to assist others in imagining alternative possibilities by exploring the sense making of
ontology, epistemology, and ethics within the historical moments of mathematics education
research (Stinson & Bullock, 2012). I begin by connecting these philosophical considerations to
paradigms of inquiry (i.e., theoretical and methodological considerations)—more familiar terrain
for mathematics education researchers.
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PARADIGMS OF INQUIRY AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION RESEARCH
Details of various paradigms of inquiry available to mathematics education researchers through
the overlapping and simultaneously operating historical moments of mathematics education
research—the process–product moment (1970s–), the interpretivist–constructivist moment
(1980s–), the social-turn moment (mid-1980s–), and the sociopolitical-turn moment (2000s–)—
are provided elsewhere (see Stinson & Bullock [2012, 2015] for details of each moment and
identified exemplars of mathematics education research studies within each moment). Without
recounting the details, Table 1 (Stinson & Walshaw, 2017, p. 133) maps these ongoing historical
moments (i.e., no end dates) to different paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate,
and deconstruct—which, in turn, support different theoretical frameworks and methodological
approaches (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1). Paradigms of
inquiry highlight for researchers “what it is they are about, and what falls within and outside the
limits of legitimate inquiry”; they are defined by responses to three fundamental and interrelated
questions: the ontological question, the epistemological question, and the methodological question
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 108). The three questions are interrelated “because the answer given to
any one question, taken in any order, constrains [more times than not] how the others may be
answered” (p. 108).
Therefore, within each of the moments, within each of the paradigms, and within each of the
theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches questions of ontology, epistemology, and,
I add, ethics (among others) are always already entangled and are either knowingly or unknowingly
engaged. Given that theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches are embedded in
paradigms of inquiry, and paradigms of inquiry are embedded in assumptions of a philosophical
type (cf. Crotty, 1998), no researcher (or research team) working in any moment, any paradigm,
or any framework or approach, I believe, should be absolved from engaging questions of a
philosophical type (cf. Ernest, 1991; Higginson, 1980).
Mirroring others (e.g., Crotty, 1998; Lather, 2006; Guba & Lincoln, 1994), I use the different
paradigms of inquiry—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct (see Table 1)—to
structure the discussion. In that, how the concepts ontology, epistemology, and ethics are made
sense of across the paradigm spectrum sheds light on not only the possible divergences in
approaches to research (mathematics education or otherwise) but also the interrelatedness of the
concepts.
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Table 1: Mapping Moments of Mathematics Education Research to Paradigms of Inquiry
 Process–Product Moment (1970s–)Predict
 Interpretivist–Constructivist Moment (1980s–)Understand
 Social-Turn Moment (mid 1980s–)Understand (albeit, contextualized understanding) or Emancipate
(or oscillate between the two)
 Sociopolitical-Turn Moment (2000s–)Emancipate or Deconstruct (or oscillate between the two)
Paradigms of Inquiry
Understand

Emancipate

Deconstruct

*Positivist
Experimental
Quasiexperimenta
l
Mixed
methods>

*Interpretivist
Social constructivist
Radical constructivist
Sociocultural>
Phenomenological
Ethnographic
Symbolic Interaction

*Critical
<Feminist>
Critical Race Theory>
Latino/a Critical Race Theory>
Critical Theories of Race>
<Participatory Action Research
Critical Ethnography

*Poststructural/
Postmodern
Postcritical
Postcolonial
Posthumanist
Post-Freudian
<Discourse Analysis

BREAK

Predict

Note. *Indicates the term most commonly used; < or > indicates cross-paradigm movement. The BREAK in
the original Lather and St. Pierre table indicated a shift from the Enlightenment humanist paradigms on
the left to the post-Enlightenment, posthumanist paradigm on the right. Here it indicates a hybrid, inbetween space where the researcher might adopt a critical postmodern theoretical tradition (see Stinson
& Bullock, 2012, 2015).
Paradigms of inquiry adapted from table by P. A. Lather and B. St. Pierre, 2005, found in “Paradigm
Proliferation as a Good Thing to Think With: Teaching Research in Education as a Wild Profusion,” by P. A.
Lather, 2006, International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, 19(1), p. 37.

Reprinted from “Exploring Different Theoretical Frontiers for Different (and Uncertain) Possibilities in
Mathematics Education Research,” by D. W. Stinson and M. A. Walshaw, 2017. In J. Cai (Ed.),
Compendium for Research in Mathematics Education, p. 133. Copyright 2017 by the National Council
of Teachers of Mathematics.

PHILOSOPHICAL
RESEARCH

CONSIDERATIONS

AND

MATHEMATICS

EDUCATION

But before I briefly discuss ontology, epistemology, and ethics, two caveats are necessary. First,
although the concepts are presented as discrete, they are in fact continuous (i.e., interrelated); in
that, to speak about one always includes speaking implicitly or explicitly about the other two (see
Cannon, 2019, for a brief discussion of Karen Barad’s ethico-onto-epistem-ology in mathematics
education research). Philosophical engagement in general is complex and multilayered; it requires
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filigree ways of thinking with multiple and overlapping trajectories; ways of thinking that embrace
uncertainty and openness rather than the fictions of certainty and closure. Second, the discussion
is intended to be neither an argument between quantitative science versus qualitative science (see
Ercikan & Roth, 2006) nor an argument between continental philosophy versus analytic
philosophy (see Cooper, 1994). But rather, an informative discussion in which no matter where a
person positions herself or himself (or themself) on the paradigm spectrum she or he (or they) sees
the importance of knowingly engaging philosophical considerations throughout the research
process.
Ontology
Ontology is one of those philosophical concepts that philosophers and theorists as well as
researchers acknowledge but most attempt to quickly move over, under, or around in efforts to
avoid meeting it head on. Its metaphysical part is its most avoided. Recall, in the context of social
science research in general, the ontological question is the first of three interrelated questions to
ask with respect to which paradigm(s) of inquiry the researcher might be positioned: “What is the
form and nature of reality and therefore, what is there that can be known about it” (Guba & Lincoln,
1994, p. 108). Ontology in the context of mathematics education (research or otherwise) is further
complicated by the “realness” (or not) of two specific entities: mathematical objects and human
beings (Ernest, 2016a). The prevailing ontology of mathematical objects for over two millenniums,
Platonism, asserts that mathematical objects exist independent of human beings’ thought,
language, and practices. Ernest (1998), however, in careful detail discusses and critiques this
ontological stance and others in his argument for a social constructivism as a philosophy of
mathematics and, in turn, of mathematics education (research or otherwise) (see also Davis &
Hersh, 1981/1998; Hersh, 1997; Tymoczko, 1998). The move toward a social constructivism as a
philosophy of mathematics teaching, learning, and research engages ontological considerations of
the nature of human beings. Here, it is not only a question of the nature of mathematical objects
but also a question of the nature of “the ‘non-essential essence’ of learners, teachers and persons
in general presupposed by teaching, learning and research in mathematics” (Ernest, 2016a, p. 7).
Ontological considerations are understood differently in each of the paradigms of inquiry: predict,
understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. For instance, ontology in the predict paradigm (i.e.,
positivists) is objective realism, a view that objects—for example, mathematical objects—exist
independent of the knower. Reality here is “objective” and “found” (Lather, 2006). This objective
found reality is ordered by natural laws and mechanisms; the “‘way things are’ is conventionally
summarized in the form of time- and context-free generalizations, some of which take the form of
cause–effect laws” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 109). Direct experience not speculation is the
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foundation of science, which advances “by a study of the ‘given’ (in Latin datum or, in the plural,
data)” (Crotty, 1998, p. 20).
Ontology for the interpretivists and constructivists of the understand paradigm is subjective
relativism. The real here is “apprehendable in the form of multiple, intangible mental
constructions, socially and experientially based, local and specific in nature…and dependent for
their form and content on the individual persons or groups holding the constructions (Guba &
Lincoln, p. 110–111). Although there are important differences between the relativism of
interpretivists and the relativism of constructivists, an essential similarity is that both uncritically
accept the realness of their individual and collective interpretations and constructions (Crotty,
1998); critical here is understood in the critical theoretical sense (cf. Bronner, 2011). In short,
reality is subjectively yet uncritically interpreted and constructed (Lather, 2006).
Historical realism is the ontology of the emancipate paradigm (i.e., critical theorists). What is real
is shaped by current and historical social, cultural, political, economic, racial, ethnic, gender, and
so forth discourses (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Discourses here are to be understood not only as
language but also as the complex web of institutions, structures, signs, and practices that order and
sustain socio-historical, -cultural, and -political constructed forms of social existence (Leistyna,
Woodrum, & Sherblom, 1996). These discourses are reified and sustained with and in hegemonic
structures that “are now (inappropriately) taken as ‘real,’ that is, natural and immutable” (Guba &
Lincoln, 1994, p. 110). Hegemony constructs people as objects—those who are acted upon, rather
than Subjects, those who act—who become so entrenched in their own oppressive condition that
they do not realize their own subjugation or their complicity in the perpetuation of unjust social
and economic systems (Freire, 1970/2000). Reality in brief is constituted with and in hegemonic
systems of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political discourses of power (Lather, 2006).
Reality for the poststructuralists and postmodernists of the deconstruct paradigm is unknowable:
that which exist is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and becoming. There is an
incredulity toward universal metanarratives of being (cf. Lyotard, 1979/1984). The one universal
mind of the rational human subject is replaced here with multiple minds, multiple subjects, and
multiple knowledges that reflect different socio-historical, -cultural, and -political locations
(Seidman, 1994). The ontology of the deconstruct paradigm therefore is an anti-universal realism
that attempts “to pass beyond man [and woman] and humanism” (Derrida, 1978, 292). Such an
ontology, however, is more than simply a critique of realism; in that, “it questions representation
and the underlying belief of a reality that is independent of representation yet capturable by it”
(Usher & Edwards, 1994, p. 14). In other words, “the real is not only what can be reproduced, but
that which is already reproduced” (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 146).
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Epistemology
Epistemology, unlike ontology, is often embraced by philosophers, theorists, and researchers as a
productive site for research. The absence per se of a metaphysical component makes engaging
epistemological considerations more consistent with the Enlightenment—the Age of Reason (cf.
Foucault, 1978/2003). The growth of epistemological perspectives has been exponential; for every
discipline of human pursuit there seems to be a proliferation of epistemologies.
Recall, the epistemological question is the second of three interrelated questions to ask with respect
to researcher position across the paradigm spectrum: “What is the nature of the relationship
between the knower or would-be knower and what can be known?” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p.
108). In the context of social science research in general, Crotty (1998) defines epistemology as
“the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology”
(p. 3). Such a definition makes explicitly engaging epistemological considerations throughout the
research process inescapable. Where a researcher might be able to engage ontology implicitly (or
not at all), such a strategy is not possible here. In the context of mathematics education, researchers
and educators often hold different and at times conflicting epistemological stances. These conflicts
often “lie along issues such as the subjective–objective character of knowledge, the role in
cognition of the social and cultural context, and the relationship between language and knowledge”
(Sierpinska & Lerman, 1996, p. 829). These conflicts stretch across the paradigm spectrum, given
that epistemology too is understood differently in each paradigm of inquiry.
Objectivism, for instance, is the epistemology for the positivists of the predict paradigm. Here, the
researcher and the researched “object” are independent entities, and the researcher is capable of
researching the object without influencing it or being influenced by it (Guba & Lincoln, 1994).
Ideologies and biases of the researcher do not influence research findings as long as the
prescriptive procedures of positivist science are rigorously followed (Guba & Lincoln). Objective
knowledge is not only ideologically free but also universal; replicated findings are not only
possible but also “true.”
The interpretivist and constructivist of the understand paradigm maintain a subjectivist
epistemology. The researcher and the researched object here are forever linked through
interactions; therefore, the findings are essentially produced in and through the research process
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The world and objects do not exist independent of interpretations and
constructions of the world and objects. In other words, consciousness—interpretivist and
constructivist—“is always consciousness of something” (Crotty, 1998, p. 44, emphasis in original).
Interpretivists understand knowledge as “culturally derived and historically situated interpretations
of the social life-world” (p. 67). Constructivists, on the other hand, understand knowledge as
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“contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions between human
beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context” (p. 42).
Different people and groups interpret and construct meanings differently; in that, both
interpretations and constructions are socially and experientially based and local and specific in
nature.
Similarly, critical theorists of the emancipate paradigm also acknowledge that different people and
groups interpret and construct meanings differently. These interpretations and constructions,
however, are embedded in a critical subjectivist epistemology that is forever intertwined with and
in hegemonic discourses of socio-historical, -cultural, and -political power (cf. Kincheloe &
McLaren, 1994; Kincheloe, McLaren, & Steinberg, 2011). Knowledge therefore is neither
ideologically free nor universal but rather made in and through discourses of domination and
oppression (Freire, 1970/2000).
The epistemological stance in the deconstruct paradigm is one in which the “nature” of knowledge
found in humanism is replaced with the “discursive formation” of knowledge made in and through
discursive events (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 38). Knowledge as discursive formation is not
concerned with uncovering the “truth” of the statements and discourses that comprise discursive
events per se but rather with the “historical conditions, assumptions, and power relations that allow
certain statements, and by extension, certain discourses to appear” (St. Pierre, 2000, p. 496). The
field of discursive events, however, is a grouping that is always finite and limited at any moment
to the linguistic sequences that have been formulated; these sequences may be innumerable, they
may exceed the capacities of recording, memory, or reading; nevertheless, they form a finite
grouping (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 27). In effect, knowledge as discursive formation no longer
maintains its privileged status as an objective reality, but rather knowledge itself becomes
subjected to and limited by the very socio-historical, -cultural, and -political conditions,
assumptions, and power relations against which natural knowledge within the humanist tradition
claimed immunity (Stinson, 2016).
Ethics
Ethics is often regarded as the most accessible branch of philosophy given that “many of its
presuppositions are self-evident or trivial truths: All human actions, for example, serve some end
or purpose; whether they are right or wrong depends on an actor’s overall aims” (Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017, para. 4). Dewey and Tufts (1932/1985) describe ethics simply
as “a systematic account of our judgments about conduct, in so far as these estimate it from the
standpoint of right or wrong, good or bad” (p. 9). Similar to epistemology, there has been a
proliferation of “codes of ethics” with nearly ever discipline of human pursuit developing its own.
Readers are free to copy, display, and distribute this article as long as the work is attributed to the author(s) and Mathematics
Teaching-Research Journal Online, it is distributed for non-commercial purposes only, and no alteration or transformation is
made in the work. All other uses must be approved by the author(s) or MTRJ. MTRJ is published by the City University of New
York. http://www.hostos.cuny.edu/mtrj/

MATHEMATICS TEACHING RESEARCH JOURNAL

Special Issue on Philosophy of Mathematics Education

16

Summer 2020 Vol 12 no 2

A commonality of these multiple codes with respect to research is that they often provide
guidelines on four overlapping areas of procedural concern: informed consent, deception, privacy
and confidentiality, and accuracy (Christians, 2011; see also Sowder, 1998).
In the context of social science research in general, Guillemin and Gillam (2004) identify two
dimensions of ethical concern: “procedural ethics and ‘ethics in practice’” (p. 262). They define
procedural ethics as those ethical concerns most often addressed by research ethics committees
(e.g., Institutional Review Boards). They define ethics in practice as the ongoing day-to-day ethical
concerns that arise throughout the research process (e.g., the disclosure of sensitive information
from a research participant). Although Guillemin and Gillam perceive continuity between the two
dimensions, they frame ethics in practice within reflexivity. Reflexivity requires thinking about
the researcher’s positionality and how the process of conducting research affects the study and the
human relationships developed throughout the study (Glesne, 1999). In being reflexive, the
researcher becomes alert not only to concerns related to knowledge creation (i.e., epistemology)
but also to the ethical concerns of research (Guillemin & Gillam). Here, the researcher adopts “a
continuous process of critical scrutiny and interpretation, not just in relation to the research
methods and the data but also to the researcher, participants, and the research context” (p. 275).
Similarly, in the context of mathematics education research, Ernest (2012; see also Adler &
Lerman, 2003) makes a four-point argument for ethics as the “first philosophy” of mathematics
education research. First, ethics is at the center of the research process with respect to seeking
informed consent, causing no harm or detriment, and ensuring confidentiality for all those involved
(i.e., procedural ethics). Ernest claims that any research that does not conform to these most basic
standards “is ethically flawed and its knowledge claims are suspect” (p. 13). Second, mathematics
education researchers are participating “in the great, age-old human conversation that sustains and
extends our common knowledge and cultural heritage,” as such “we and others benefit and grow”
(p. 13.) Third, the species of human beings depends on its survival by sharing in ethical social and
life behaviors with fellow humans. Fourth, drawing on Levinas and his ethics as first philosophy,
Ernest states—
we owe a debt to the other that precedes and goes beyond reasons, decisions, and our thought processes,
and precedes and exceeds any attempt to understand the other. Our infinite responsibility to the other
person is, of course, ethical: “Ethics precedes ontology […] ethics primarily signifies obligation toward
the other, that it leads to the Law and to gratuitous service, which is not a principle of technique”
(Levinas, 1987, p. 183). (p. 13)
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In the end, Ernest contends that positioning ethics as the first philosophy for mathematics
education research enables the larger research community “to rethink and re-evaluate some of the
taken-for-granted commonplaces of our practices” (p. 14). Such re-thinking and -evaluating opens
up different possibilities for theorizing and researching mathematics teaching and learning.
How ethics is taken up across the paradigm spectrum is not so much about difference as it is about
degree. Each of the paradigms—predict, understand, emancipate, and deconstruct—acknowledge
at varying levels the importance of ethics throughout the research process. (Addressing and
monitoring ethical concerns, however, have not always been practiced: e.g., the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study.) The difference is the degree to which the researcher’s focus is on procedural ethics, ethics
in practice, or somewhere in between (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). Or, in the case of mathematics
education research, points one and two (i.e., procedural ethics) or points three and four (i.e., ethics
in practice) (Ernest, 2012).
The positivists of the predict paradigm rely heavily on the check boxes of the Institutional Review
Boards; that which is ethical is knowable, discernable, and demonstrable. Objective ethical
procedures drive the research process; these procedures exist independent of both the researcher
and the researched. In the understand paradigm, ethics is a both–and concern for the interpretivists
and constructivists. In that, both procedural ethics and ethics in practice are taken up (Guillemin
& Gillam, 2004). Reflexivity here becomes key as questions about researcher and participant
positionality and how the process of conducting research affects both the study and the human
relationships are continuously engaged (Glesne, 1999). Reflexivity is key for the critical theorists
of the emancipate paradigm as well. But here reflexivity is intertwined with and in critical sociohistorical, -cultural, and -political interrogations of the so-named ethical procedures and practices
(cf. Cannella & Lincoln, 2011). Conceptualizations of “good” research are expanded to include
human well-being (Hostetler, 2005) and public interest (Ladson-Billings & Tate, 2006). Ethics in
the deconstruct paradigm is interrogated further as even the possibility of ethics is considered. In
other words, ethics, similar to existence, is always already contingent, multiple, fragmented, and
becoming. Here, the governmentality (i.e., the way in which the state exercises control of its
populace) of ethics becomes a grave concern as the ideal of a universal moral code of ethics is
catastrophic (Foucault, 1978/2003a, 1984/1996).
Summary of Ontology, Epistemology, and Ethics
Although dangerous, Table 2 provides a summary of the three philosophical considerations—
ontology, epistemology, and ethics—across the paradigms of inquiry spectrum—predict,
understand, emancipate, and deconstruct. It is dangerous because reducing a few thousand words
down to a few dozen always erases the nuances of that which has been discussed. Nonetheless,
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similar to Table 1 (see Stinson & Bullock, 2015, for details and cautioning of Table 1), Table 2 is
provided here to offer a summative account of the discussion.
Table 2: Philosophical Considerations across the Spectrum of Paradigms of Inquiry
Paradigm/
Consideration

Predict

Understand

Emancipate

Deconstruct

Ontology –
study of existence

Objective Realism:
existence
independent of
knower

Subjective
Relativism: existence
dependent on
uncritical
interpretations and
constructions of
knower

Historical Realism:
existence through
socio-historical,
-cultural, and
-political discourses
of power

Anti-Universal
Realism: existence
always already
contingent, multiple,
fragmented, and
becoming

Epistemology –
study of knowledge

Objectivism:
knowledge
independent

Subjectivism:
knowledge in and
through interactions:
interpreted and
constructed

Critical Subjectivism:
knowledge in and
through discourses
of domination and
oppression

Discursive
Formation:
knowledge in and
through discursive
events

Procedural ethics
and reflexive ethics
in practice

Critical integrations
of procedural ethics
and reflexive ethics
in practice

Ethics always already
contingent, multiple,
fragmented, and
becoming; antiuniversal moral code
of ethics

Ethics –
principles of morality

Objective procedural
ethics

CONCLUDING WORDS
It is important to acknowledge that ontology, epistemology, and ethics are not the only
philosophical considerations that are explicitly or implicitly engaged during the research process.
Higginson (1980) also pointed to considerations about beauty (i.e., aesthetics), purpose (i.e.,
teleology), and value (i.e., axiology). In more general terms, how a researcher understands the
possibilities or impossibilities of issues such as “truth,” “certainty,” and “logical consistency” is
dependent on how she or he (or they) positions herself or himself (or themself) across the paradigm
spectrum. Such decisions are not only about theoretical frameworks and methodological
approaches but also, and more germane, about worldviews: a particular standpoint or philosophy
for living in and making sense of the world.
Lester and Wiliam (2005) claim that the relationship between knowledge claims and evidence
regarding what is researched, how research is conducted, and how results are interpreted and
represented is more than simply establishing logical consistency but rather is determined, in large
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part, by a set of beliefs, values, and perspectives operating in the worldview of the researcher.
Comparably, Lerman (2013) contends that the theoretical framework through which a researcher
organizes her or his (or their) “research, reads the data, revisits theory and interprets the findings
is critical, and without such work the values of the researcher are hidden but never absent, of
course” (p. 629). Valero (2004) also points to researcher values:
What we choose to research and the ways in which we carry out that research are constructions
determined, among other factors, by who we are and how we choose to engage in academic inquiry…
There are considerable ‘subjective’ and ‘ideological’ grounds—rather than ‘objective’ reasons—to
engage in particular ways of conceiving and conducting research in mathematics education. (p. 2)

Ultimately, considerations of ontology, epistemology, ethics, values, subjective and ideological
grounds, and so on—that is, the researcher’s worldview—should precede not follow theoretical
and methodological considerations. Explicitly and critically interrogating one’s worldview (i.e.,
one’s philosophical stances) should be the starting point of any research project, and maintained
throughout. Without an explicit, critical, and continuous interrogation of one’s philosophical
stances, researchers are often mired in simplistic conceptions and theoretical and methodological
choices that perpetuate an “inquiry-as-technique mindset” (Paul & Marfo, 2001, p. 53) rather than
inquiry-as-scholarly endeavor mindset (Boote & Beile, 2005). Throughout the process of
conducting research on mathematics teaching and learning, such an interrogation might include
asking a series of questions such as: Does mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists outside of
human interactions? How do we know that mathematics, teaching, and/or learning exists (or not)?
What is mathematical knowing? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for mathematics
knowing, mathematics teaching, and/or mathematics learning? Beyond procedural ethics, what are
the ethical obligations of mathematics education researchers? Are the ethical obligations of
mathematics education researchers different from other disciplinary researchers? Responses to
these (and other) generic, if you will, questions that should be asked throughout the research
process take on different possibilities depending on the philosophical stances of the researcher.
Not only are the possibilities of responses unique but also the very questions that might be asked
are unique. In other words, philosophically stances of the researcher drive both the possibilities
and the impossibilities of what questions might be or should be asked throughout the research
process. Maintaining a critical interrogation of one’s philosophical stances throughout is difficult
because it refutes certainty and closure. But through an explicit, critical, and continuous
exploration of one’s philosophical stances, the frantic search that novice (and even seasoned)
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researchers often experience in selecting theoretical frameworks and methodological approaches,
I believe, more times than not becomes self-evident and trivial.
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